An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt by Engelmann, Dirk & Strobel, Martin
An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness
Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr
and Schmidt∗
Dirk Engelmann†and Martin Strobel‡
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
April 13, 2000
Abstract
In this note we present an experiment to compare the two compet-
ing fairness theories by Bolton / Ockenfels and Fehr / Schmidt. For
most experiments that these theories have previously been applied to,
they make similar predictions so that it is difficult to compare their
predictive accuracy. We designed a very simple experiment that in-
duces opposing predictions made by both theories. We find that if the
maximization of total payoff is in line with the decision predicted by
Fehr and Schmidt, almost all subjects decide accordingly, whereas if
it is in line with the prediction by Bolton and Ockenfels, decisions are
dispersed.
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1 Introduction
Attention has recently been drawn to Bolton and Ockenfels’ “Theory of Eq-
uity, Reciprocity and Competition” [forthcoming], and Fehr and Schmidt’s
“Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation” [1999], in the remainder
of this note denoted by ERC and F&S, respectively. Both groups of authors
quote an impressive number of experimental results that can be explained
by their theories. However, if one wants to compare the predictive power of
these two theories, most of the experiments that are interpreted retrospec-
tively with these two theories are not helpful. For most experiments, they
make equal or very similar predictions and thus their performance is simi-
lar. For example, both theories explain the results in ultimatum bargaining
games reasonably well.
Both models rely on inequality aversion to explain deviations from selfish
behavior. The fundamental difference between ERC and F&S is represented
in the motivation or utility functions. The motivation function of ERC is
given by vi(yi, σi), with yi denoting the own payoff and σi the share of the
total payoff, and vi for given yi being maximal if σi = 1n , n being the number
of players. F&S assumes a utility function Ui(x) = xi−αi 1n−1
P
j 6=imax{xj−
xi, 0} − βi 1n−1
P
j 6=imax{xi − xj, 0} with αi > βi > 0 and xi the payoff of
subject i.
Hence ERC assumes that subjects like the average payoff to be as close as
possible to their own payoff while F&S assumes that subjects dislike a payoff
difference to any other individual. Thus while according to ERC a subject
would be equally happy if all subjects received the same payoff or if some
were rich and some were poor as long as she received the average, according
to F&S she would clearly prefer the first situation. In a real life situation
F&S predicts that the middle class would tax the upper class to subsidize
the poor, in an ERC world the middle class would just be satisfied.
To obtain explicitly opposite predictions by the two theories we chose a
very simple game that focuses on their fundamental difference. Furthermore,
it was completely reduced to the primary question that is considered by these
theories, that of distribution. All a subject had to do was to choose an alloca-
tion of money between two other subjects, called persons in the experiment.
The person who had the choice received an intermediate payoff and chose
between three different allocations between a person who received in any
case more than her and a person who in all allocations received less. These
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allocations were such that whenever she chose one with an average payoff for
the other two persons closer to her’s, both individual payoffs became more
distant from her’s, i.e. the richest person got richer and the poorest poorer.
ERC predicts that she chooses the allocation that is most unequal between
the other two persons because the average payoff is closest to her own. The
opposite allocation is predicted by F&S to be chosen, since it minimizes the
distance to the payoff of both the richer and the poorer person.
Apart from equity considerations other aspects might influence the de-
cision of the subjects. In particular preferences for efficiency may lead to a
choice that maximizes total payoff. (This would also result form altruism,
but since subjects could maximize total payoff without any cost, in cannot be
decided whether this is the actual motivation.) To prevent interference with
the objective of our experiment, we designed two treatments, one in which
following the prediction by ERC leads to a maximization of total payoff, one
where maximization of total payoff is in line with the F&S prediction. The
preferable way to prevent interference by efficiency would have been that all
allocations yielded the same total payoff. However, if the own payoff is fixed,
ERC only yields a clear prediction if the average and thus the total payoff of
the other subjects differs in the three allocations.
We applied what could be called a mini strategy method. All subjects
had to choose an allocation, while groups of three were randomly formed
later on. Subjects knew that their decision would only matter if they were
assigned to be person 2 in their group and that their payoff was fixed in that
case, such that their decision could never influence their own payoff. Apart
from generating three times the data by that method it also secured that all
subjects were considered to be equally entitled to the money since they had
all performed the same task. It also prevented that we had to pay subjects
for doing nothing.
In the treatment where the prediction of F&S leads to a maximization of
total payoff the results clearly confirm this prediction. The broad majority
of subjects made that decision. In the other treatment subjects chose in
about equal proportions the two extreme allocations and some chose the
intermediate allocation. Hence in our simple decision task the performance
of F&S is much better than that of ERC, although both theories ignore the
importance that subjects assign to efficiency.
Section 2 presents our experimental design, followed by the experimental
results in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Experimental Design and Predictions
We conducted the experiment at the end of the lecture in one of the first weeks
of an introductory economics course at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 136
subjects took part in the experiment, 68 for each treatment. Each subject
received a decision sheet with the instructions and a questionnaire, which
we used to gather some biographical data and to check whether the subjects
understood the task completely.
The decision sheet contained three different allocations of money between
three persons, of which they had to choose one. They were informed that
we would randomly form groups of three later on and would also assign the
three roles randomly. Only the choice of that subject selected as person 2
mattered. The payoff of that subject was the same in all the three allocations
they had to choose from. Hence no subject could influence her own payoff.
The allocations differed by the distance between the payoffs of person
2 and the other persons. The allocation where the distance between the
payoffs of person 2 and each of the other persons was minimal was such that
the distance to the average payoff was maximal and vice versa. Thus ERC
and F&S predict the choice of exactly opposing allocations, since the former
assumes that a disutility is caused by a difference between the own payoff
and the average payoff, while the latter is based on a dislike for any payoff
difference to other individuals.
Our two treatments differed by the effect the choice had on the total
payoff. In treatment F the allocation that maximized the total payoff min-
imized the distance between the payoff of person 2 and those of persons 1
and 3, whereas it maximized the distance between the payoff of person 2 and
the average of the payoffs of persons 1 and 3. Hence maximization of total
payoff leads to the same decision as predicted by F&S (and that is why it is
called treatment F). In treatment E there was the opposite relation, so that
the choice predicted by ERC maximizes total payoff. Neither ERC, nor F&S,
nor the maximization of total payoff predicts that the intermediate allocation
will ever be chosen.
Each treatment was also divided into two subtreatments that only dif-
fered by the order in which the allocations were presented on the decision
sheet. This was done to avoid some conceivable influence of a preference for
the center or right allocation. (The allocation with intermediate payoffs was
always presented on the left, since we considered this to be the most promi-
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nent position but it was the allocation we were not really interested in.) To
avoid influence by computation errors we also noted the average payoffs of
persons 1 and 3 and the total payoff for each allocation in the decision sheet,
which looked similar to the tables below. (Actually, this implied that ERC
was getting a pretty fair shot.) Subjects were paid in class the following
week. They were identified by codes that were noted both on the decision
sheets and on attached identification sheets that the subjects kept.
The possible allocations were for treatment F (subtreatment FH, in sub-
treatment FN columns B and C were reversed)
A B C
Person 1 3.60 DM 4.60 DM 2.60 DM
Person 2 5.60 DM 5.60 DM 5.60 DM
Person 3 8.80 DM 8.20 DM 9.40 DM
Average 1 and 3 6.20 DM 6.40 DM 6.00 DM
Total 1,2,3 18.00 DM 18.40 DM 17.60 DM
and for treatment E (subtreatment EN, in subtreatment EH columns B and
C were reversed)
A B C
Person 1 3.20 DM 3.80 DM 2.60 DM
Person 2 6.40 DM 6.40 DM 6.40 DM
Person 3 8.40 DM 7.40 DM 9.40 DM
Average 1 and 3 5.80 DM 5.60 DM 6.00 DM
Total 1,2,3 18.00 DM 17.60 DM 18.40 DM
In both these subtreatments F&S predicts a choice of allocation B, while
ERC predicts a choice of allocation C. In subtreatment FH allocation B is
efficient and in subtreatment EN allocation C.
3 Experimental Results
The results of our experiment are presented in Table 1. In both treatments
there is virtually no difference between the two subtreatments. Hence we can
conclude that the results are not driven by a preference for either the middle
or the right column and we pool the data from the respective subtreatments.
A preference for the left column might have increased the choices for the
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Treatment ERC F&S inter
FN 2(6%) 29(85%) 3(9%)
FH 2(6%) 28(82%) 4(12%)
F 4(6%) 57(84%) 7(10%)
EN 14(41%) 12(35%) 8(24%)
EH 13(38%) 13(38%) 8(24%)
E 27(40%) 25(37%) 16(24%)
total 31(23%) 82(60%) 23(17%)
Table 1: Number of subjects choosing the allocations predicted by ERC
(ERC), predicted by F&S (F&S), and the intermediate allocation (inter), by
treatment and by subtreatment
intermediate allocation, but since our interest is focussed on the two extreme
allocations, we can ignore this possible though unlikely effect.
The results for treatment F are very clear. Of 68 subjects, 57 chose the
allocation that led to a maximization of utility according to F&S and also to
a maximization of total payoff. On the other hand, only 4 subjects chose the
allocation predicted by ERC, and 7 subjects the intermediate allocation. A
χ2-test shows that the hypothesis that all three allocations are chosen with
equal probability can be rejected (χ2 = 78.21, p < .001). Taking the number
of choices of the intermediate allocation as given, a binomial test shows that
the hypothesis that the allocations predicted by the two theories are chosen
with equal probability can also be rejected (p < .001).
For treatment E the results are more dispersed. While of 68 subjects
27 chose the allocation predicted by ERC that also maximized total payoff,
25 decided according to the prediction by F&S and 16 subjects chose the
intermediate allocation. The hypothesis that all three allocations are chosen
with equal probability can not be rejected at a 5%-level according to a χ2-
test (χ2 = 3.03, p > .2). In particular we can conclude that in this treatment
there is no significant difference between the probabilities with which the two
extreme allocations are chosen.
Taking both treatments together, 82 subjects chose the allocation pre-
dicted by F&S, whereas 31 decided in line with ERC and 23 chose the inter-
mediate allocation. According to a χ2-test the probabilities with which the
three allocations are chosen are significantly different (χ2 = 45.19, p < .001).
A binomial test, taking the number of choices of the intermediate allocation
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as given, shows that the probabilities for the choices predicted by ERC and
by F&S are significantly different (p < .001). Of the 136 choices in both
treatments, 84 are in line with the maximization of total payoffs while 29
are opposite to it. A binomial test shows that this difference is significant
(p < .001). Hence opposed to the assumption made by both ERC and F&S
that efficiency does not matter we find a clear influence.
We find no notable gender effect on the probabilities of choices in line
with ERC or F&S. However, the intermediate allocation is more attractive
to males (16 choices) than to females (7 choices), with total numbers of males
and females being almost equal (71 vs. 65).
If we exclude from the analysis those subjects who gave explanations for
their decisions that indicated that they did not understand the instructions
correctly, the results do not change substantially. For treatment E instead of
27 decisions in line with ERC and 25 with F&S, the numbers are 22 and 23,
whereas those for the intermediate decision do not change. In treatment F
instead of 57 decisions corresponding to the F&S prediction and 4 to ERC,
we have 51 and 3, while the decisions for the intermediate allocation decrease
from 7 to 6. The results of the statistical tests will not change if we use this
adapted data.
In the explanation given for their decisions, 18 subjects explicitly referred
to fairness. 17 of them chose according to F&S, including 8 subjects who also
referred to the maximal total payoff. The remaining subject chose the inter-
mediate allocation. Of 12 subjects who stated the reason for their decisions
was maximization of total payoff (without explicit reference to fairness), 8
were in treatment F and thus chose the allocation predicted by F&S, the
other four in treatment E chose according to ERC. Only one subject referred
to the relative payoff but opposed to ERC aimed at maximizing the positive
difference between the own and the average payoff. Thus among the subjects
who explicitly mention fairness as a motivation F&S does much better than
ERC.
The average payoff to each participant was DM 6.01. The experiment
took about 20 minutes.
4 Conclusion
We presented a simple individual decision experiment to compare the rela-
tive performance of the competing fairness theories by Bolton and Ockenfels
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[forthcoming, ERC] and by Fehr and Schmidt [1999, F&S]. Subjects had to
choose between three allocations for two other subjects with whom they were
randomly chosen as a group. The allocations were chosen such that the two
theories always predicted opposite decisions. The two treatments differed
with respect to which theory was in line with efficiency.
The results are clearly in favor of F&S compared to ERC. In the treatment
where the F&S prediction maximized total payoff, the vast majority chose
this allocation. In contrast, in the other treatment choices split about equally
between the F&S and the ERC prediction. In total the predictive power of
F&S is significantly higher than that of ERC. Furthermore, efficiency plays
a significant role.
Two main conclusions of our experiment arise. First, in such a simple
decision task, subjects clearly care about equality of others’ payoffs. In con-
trast, ERC ignores any influence of inequality between other persons. Second,
subjects also clearly care for efficiency contrary to the predictions by both
F&S and ERC which ignore in the utility or motivation function an efficiency
(or possibly an altruism) component, that could explain the desire to max-
imize total payoff. As treatment E shows, the effects of inequality aversion
concerning others’ payoffs and of efficiency have roughly equal impact in the
present experiment. The relatively high number of choices for the intermedi-
ate allocation and some of the explanations also indicate that subjects were
driven by these two conflicting motives in this case.
Both the better accuracy of F&S and the relevance of efficiency may
have been emphasized by the mini strategy method that we applied. Since
subjects did not know the role they would end up in, they might have felt
more sympathy with the other persons, than they might have felt if they had
known to be person 2, although they knew their decision would only matter
in that role. Increased sympathy with person 1 would yield more choices
in line with F&S, while that with both other persons would imply choices
maximizing total payoff.
A further possible limitation of both ERC and F&S is that they ignore
intentions. However, since in the present experiment no choices of other
players are observed, intentions do not matter and thus we cannot compare
the performance of both theories to others that take intentions into account
like Rabin [1993].
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